微观经济与数字经济教研室学术讲座

报告题目：Optimal mechanisms with non-quasilinear preferences
报  告 人：James Bergin（梅努斯大学经济学系 教授）
主  持 人：杨尔雅（williamhill中国 助理教授）
时      间：2026年3月13日（周五）14: 30
地      址：岭南堂伍沾德会议室（204）
语      言：英 文

摘要:
     This paper considers the classic mechanism design problem—maximizing an objective subject to a system of incentive compatibility constraints. This problem has been studied extensively in the case of quasilinear preferences, but the general case has received little attention in the mechanism design literature. This paper studies the general case, considering separately the incentive structure and implied incentive compatible linkages, then evaluating incentive compatible variations relative to an arbitrary objective function. This provides a new method and perspective to the optimization problem. When bunching occurs, it’s not possible to implement the ‘ironing’ technique, but the method here carries over directly to this case. One special case of this model is examined in detail—where there is risk aversion in preferences and the objective. Finally, for the general case, a simple numerical optimization routine is given to determine an approximate solution.

报告人介绍：

      研究兴趣：微观经济理论、知识产权、产业组织、机制设计与公共经济学。 
      教育背景：学士（爱尔兰国立大学），理学硕士（伦敦政治经济学院），博士（普林斯顿大学）。

       欢迎感兴趣的师生参加！